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Abstract 
The current discussion of consumerism in higher education focuses largely on 
what the providers are obliged to do for the consumers, fuelled by the rising tuition 
fees. This framework does not always sit comfortably with lecturers in the context of 
a learning and teaching relationship, as it appears to ignore the reciprocal obligations 
lecturers and learners have to one another. The purpose of this paper is to offer an 
alternative view of what lecturers and learners are obliged to do in the learning and 
teaching relationship, if learning is to be effective.  
The claims made in this paper are as follows: 
 In higher education, both learners and lecturers have moral role obligations; 
 These moral role obligations are derived from the functions of the roles being 
voluntarily undertaken by each party; 
 Therefore, by ascertaining the functions of a learner and of a lecturer, both a 
descriptive purpose and a normative purpose will be revealed for each; 
 Using moral role obligations as a basis for the student/lecturer relationship 
offers a less contentious alternative to the consumerist model. 
This paper demonstrates, using Aristotle’s function argument, that defining the 
function of an entity (in this case a role), has both a descriptive and normative 
purpose. It then briefly outlines possible definitions for the roles of learner and 
lecturer in higher education. Having made a claim (albeit a tentative one) to define 
the functions of learner and lecturer, recommendations are made on how these role 
obligations can be utilised to create an effective learning relationship. 
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Introduction 
There has been a good deal of discussion in the literature about the consumerist 
culture developing in the UK  higher education (HE) system since the introduction of 
‘top-up’ fees in September 2006 (for example Evans 2007, Jones 2010). With tuition 
fees set to increase significantly, this debate is unlikely to diminish in the near future. 
Authors, such as Evans (2007) claim the impact of consumer power, as a 
consequence of the National Student Survey and league tables, has been felt across 
the sector. Unlike in many other countries, where learners have long occupied the 
role of paying customers, this is a new phenomenon in the UK, which has been 
greeted with discomfort by many. Ramsden (2008), whilst Chief Executive of the 
Higher Education Academy, suggested he would rather students were viewed as 
partners in the learning process, than paying customers. 
Unlike Jones (2010), who suggests that the sector needs to “engage with the 
notion of student as customer” (p44) in order to meet their expectations, I am offering 
an alternative view which recognises that both the learner and lecturers have moral 
obligations to one another. In this paper I want to focus on the role obligations of two 
of the stakeholders involved in the higher education experience, namely, those of the 
learner1 and the lecturer. Whilst the sector may need to engage with the consumer 
model at institution/customer level, I will argue that this is not appropriate in the 
pedagogic relationship between lecturer and learner. 
The claims made in this paper are as follows: 
 In higher education, both learners and lecturers have moral role obligations; 
 These moral role obligations are derived from the functions of the roles being 
voluntarily undertaken by each party; 
                                                 
1 For the purpose of this paper, I will use the term learner as a generic term for individuals paying for 
higher education. 
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 Therefore, by ascertaining the functions of a learner and of a lecturer, both a 
descriptive purpose and a normative purpose will be revealed for each; 
 Using moral role obligations as a basis for the student/lecturer relationship 
offers a less contentious alternative to the consumerist model. 
 
I will first examine the concept of moral role obligations and establish that these 
are ontologically linked to the function of the role that each party undertakes. I will 
demonstrate, using Aristotle’s function argument, that defining the function of an 
entity (in this case a role), has both a descriptive and normative purpose. I will then 
briefly outline possible definitions for the roles of learner and lecturer in higher 
education. Having made a claim (albeit a tentative one) to define the functions of 
learner and lecturer, I will discuss the implications of my argument for lecturers in 
higher education. 
It is important to point out that this paper does not offer a concept analysis of a 
consumerist model of higher education. I will briefly outline some common views of 
why this concept might not provide the most positive foundation for the relationship 
between lecturers and their learners. It is also important to stress that this paper is 
only concerned with moral role obligations, rather than legal role obligations2. My 
concern is not with what both stakeholders must do in order to fulfil their legal 
obligations; rather what each one ought to do if they occupy those roles.  
Because I am making a claim that the moral role obligations are derived from the 
function of an entity3, most of this paper comprises defending that claim by 
philosophical argument. Likewise, as I have modified an existing concept of moral 
role obligations (Hardimon 1994) and made a direct link to Aristotle’s function 
                                                 
2 Please see, for example,  Melear (2003) for a comprehensive review of legal role obligations. 
3 By which, I refer to the ‘function’ of an entity  in Aristotelian terms 
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argument4, I have focussed on defending that claim rather than comparing and 
contrasting various views of moral role obligations. Finally, I should like to recognise 
that the role of lecturer, and that of student, is wider than just the learning and 
teaching. However, for the purpose of this paper, I am focussing exclusively on the 
aspects of these two roles that pertain to the learning and teaching relationship 
between the two entities. This is because it is this aspect that has been at the 
forefront of the discussion about ‘students as consumers’, and about which there is 
such unease. 
Consumerist models 
 Although the concept of ‘students as consumers’ is not new, most of the 
scholarly papers5 on this issue are based in the US (for example: Delucchi and 
Smith 1997, Shepperd 1997, Delucchi and Korgen 2002). The main problem 
appears to be that the consumer model can create “an adversarial or competitive 
relationship” (Shepperd 1997, p335) within what should be more of a collaborative 
learning relationship. Delucchi and Korgen (2002) criticise the dominance of the 
market economy in education, and claim that it is leading to an increased 
disengagement by students. Their study indicates one of the main problems is a 
mismatch between what students feel they are buying (as consumers) and what their 
lecturers feel they are selling. Over 40% of their student sample believed that paying 
tuition fees equated to buying a degree. Their results indicate that ‘students as 
consumers’ do not recognise the need to invest sufficiently in their own education. 
Whilst Delucchi and Korgen (2002), and others, recognise the benefits of a 
consumer approach to the facilities side of HE in improving the conditions for 
students, the problem with a consumer approach for the learning and teaching 
                                                 
4 Which was not specifically made by Hardimon himself. 
5 As opposed to discussion or comment papers. 
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relationship is that “the teacher-student relationship is not intrinsically economic” 
(p106).  
  Shepperd (1997, p334) argues that a “professional/client model” is an 
improvement on a straight consumer model. However, he argues that it is still difficult 
to keep education as the focus as the boundaries blur between student qua learner 
and student qua client. Shepperd (1997) goes on to advocate a partnership model 
where both partners are engaged in the process of learning. Whilst I agree, it is not 
clear how this differs to what should have been the status quo or how the trend to 
consumerism can be tackled. Naidoo and Jamieson (2005, p271), discussing the 
emerging consumerism in the UK, claim that the “previously integrated relationships 
between academics and students are likely to become disengaged” in a consumer 
model of HE. Naidoo and Jamieson (2005), whilst acknowledging the paucity of 
empirical evidence in this area, claim that the biggest danger of a consumer model is 
the impact on the learning and teaching relationship. They point out that the 
evidence to date suggests ‘students as consumers’ become increasingly disengaged 
and passive, demonstrating a lack of responsibility for their role in the learning 
process. In other words, learners have lost sight of the function of a student qua 
learner, rather than as a consumer. If they don’t identify with the role of a learner, 
they will not be aware of the moral obligations derived from that role. This is why I 
will argue that, within the learning and teaching relationship, we need an alternative 
to the consumer model. 
  
Moral Role Obligations 
Hardimon (1994, p334) defines the term role obligation as “a moral 
requirement, which attaches to an institutional role, whose content is fixed by the 
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function of the role, and whose normative force flows from the role.” In other words, 
the function of a learner and that of a lecturer, give rise to obligations, which persons 
fulfilling those functions ought to fulfil.   
Hardimon (1994) refers to the moral role obligations attached to formal roles, 
such as those we are examining, as contractual role obligations6. He claims there 
are two key characteristics that define these role obligations, namely, voluntary 
acceptance and role identification.  
Voluntary acceptance 
In order to be morally obligated to undertake the function assigned to the 
institutional role of learner or lecturer, the person must voluntarily consent to 
undertake that role. This is an important aspect of role obligations because one 
cannot judge the conduct of an individual against a normative framework attached to 
a role, if the person has not voluntarily accepted that role. If I did not voluntarily 
accept the role of lecturer, then I cannot be expected to view myself as being morally 
obliged to do what lecturers ought to do. Let us assume, for the purpose of this 
paper, that both lecturers and learners have voluntarily accepted their roles.  
Role identification 
The issue of role identification is a little more complex. Hardimon (1994) 
argues that not only must a person voluntarily accept the role and its obligations but 
they must identify with that role. 
 
“To identify with a role is 
I. To occupy the role; 
II. To recognize that one occupies the role;  
III. To conceive of oneself as someone for whom the 
norms of the role function as reasons.” 
(Hardimon, 1994, p358) 
 
                                                 
6 Despite the term, Hardimon is not discussing legal role obligations. 
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The first two conditions of role identification are self-explanatory. For example, 
one must actually be a learner (or lecturer) and recognise oneself as a learner (or 
lecturer) if the third condition is to have meaning. The third condition is best 
described by Hardimon himself in his example of a judge 
 
“If you are a judge who identifies with the role of judge, the 
fact that this is something judges do (in the normative sense) 
will give you a reason for doing it. And conversely, if you 
regard the fact that this is something judges do as giving you 
a reason to do it, you conceive of yourself as a judge” 
(Hardimon 1994, p358) 
 
The function of a judge not only describes the purpose of that role, but also 
provides a normative framework for what a judge ought to do in order to fulfil this 
function, with the excellence proper to it. If one perceives oneself as occupying the 
role of judge, then doing what a judge ought to do provides reasoning for actions 
taken in pursuit of being an excellent example of a judge. However, Hardimon’s 
position is weak if he is viewing this as a necessary condition of role obligation, as he 
appears to give permission for one to exclude oneself from role obligations if one 
does not identify oneself with that role. I consider that the necessary and sufficient 
conditions for being subject to role obligations are much simpler than Hardimon 
portrays. These are simply that 
 
I. The individual occupies the role 
II. The individual voluntarily accepted the role, satisfying the conditions of 
informed consent to do so. 
 
The second and third conditions of Hardimon’s role identification illustrate two 
possible reasons why people may not perceive the need to fulfil their role obligations.  
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However, these are not necessary conditions for the role obligations to apply. For 
example, learners may only identify with their role of consumer and judge their 
actions pertaining to fulfilling only that role. However, they cannot avoid the role 
obligations derived from the role of learner, if they are voluntarily occupying that role. 
Whilst it may help us to understand why they fail to identify with their role as learner, 
it is not a reason to dismiss their obligations.  
In my account of role obligations, individuals who occupy an institutional role, 
and who fail to fulfil the function of that role, can be judged as failing or deficient, 
relative to the normative framework derived from the function of that role. In 
Hardimon’s account, individuals who do not identify with their institutional role cannot 
be judged in relation to such a framework. For example, a lecturer who is teaching or 
facilitating a learner in higher education, cannot simply avoid his role obligations 
purely because he does not view himself as subject to the norms of the role function. 
I have met lecturers who consider themselves to be primarily researchers, even 
though they are involved in teaching learners.  As such, by Hardimon’s criteria, they 
may choose not to fulfil their role obligations as lecturers7. This would not be 
acceptable in the learning and teaching relationship, which is why I have 
strengthened the position for my account of role obligations. 
 
The Function of Learners and Lecturers 
 
I have argued above that the role obligations attached to a defined role are 
derived from the function of the role being voluntarily occupied. It is now necessary 
to defend my claim that the function of an entity8 has both a descriptive and a 
                                                 
7 In the learning and teaching aspect of that role, which is the focus of this paper. 
8 The term ‘entity’ refers to a specific institutional role in this case 
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normative purpose. It is necessary to demonstrate this in order to support the claim 
that the function of an entity can give rise to moral obligations. In order to do this, I 
propose to use the ‘function argument’ from Aristotle’s Nichomachean Ethics (Book 
One).9 In doing so, I am aware of exposing myself to difficulties, given the many 
philosophical challenges this argument presents. However, it is not the purpose of 
this paper to defend the position, or resolve the difficulties in Aristotle’s claim.  I 
intend only to take what I need from the argument to substantiate my claim that there 
are central functions of both a learner and a lecturer, which define the normative 
position of what they ought to do. The function argument seems eminently suited to 
this role, for as Megone (1998, p192) argues: “if we can determine the function or 
purpose of a thing, then we can determine the good of a thing of that kind”. 
Therefore, if we can determine the function of the learner and lecturer roles, we can 
then determine what the individuals who occupy these roles ought to do.  
Brief outline of the function argument 
Aristotle’s Nichomachean Ethics (Book One) begins by claiming there is one 
supreme good, which constitutes the essence of a good life, and to which all other 
goods merely contribute.  Having made a claim that there is a supreme good, 
Aristotle goes on to define what this is. He begins by arguing that the supreme good 
is what could be called ‘happiness’. However, he is not content to leave this term 
loosely defined, but he wants to “try to describe at least in outline” (NE Bk1 1094a 
25), what happiness really is. Lawrence (2006) explains that the role of the function 
argument is to elucidate eudaimonia: we can see better what constitutes a wonderful 
life, by looking at what it is ‘to live’ (that is, to function as a human being).  The 
definition of happiness lies in determining the purpose of all actions. If we know what 
                                                 
9 Unless otherwise stated, I have used the Penguin Classics version translated by JAK Thomson – see 
bibliography for full details 
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our function is, then this in itself will tell us what happiness is, that which defines the 
purpose of our actions. The purpose of our actions is to fulfil our function well, since 
to do so will bring us the greatest happiness.  
Although Aristotle is seeking to elucidate the meaning of a human life, the 
function argument could be said to originate from observation of how other ‘things’ 
function and what role the function of a ‘thing’ plays in determining its goodness. This 
function both defines the very essence of what that thing is, and provides a 
normative measure for judging the “goodness” (NE Bk1 1097b 27) of that thing10. It is 
this normative part of the function argument that I am concerned with in this paper. 
Learners and lecturers can achieve the ultimate ‘good’ if they fulfil their functions 
and, of course, the role obligations derived from each function. 
There are three important aspects to the function argument that allow for a 
triangulation of sorts, namely, the essence of an entity, its function and the goodness 
of that entity. The example of a knife is sometimes used to illustrate this teleological 
relationship. The function of a knife is to cut, because it is in essence a sharp cutting 
device. The best state for a knife is for it to be cutting well, because that is what 
knives exist for, and they must be sharp to fulfil their function.  The normative aspect 
of the function argument differentiates between merely fulfilling the function, and 
doing it well. A blunt knife will cut (after a fashion) but a sharp knife will cut well. In 
Aristotle’s normative function argument, the blunt knife is a bad or defective knife 
and the sharp knife is a good knife. The ‘ultimate good’ or the ‘chief happiness’ for a 
knife is to be a sharp knife that cuts well. A knife will have a wonderful life (as lives of 
knives go), if it is cutting well. This is what its purpose is (its reason for being) and 
this is also how we judge if it is a good knife. So for Aristotle, the function of an entity 
                                                 
10 In the Dover publication of NE (Kaufman 1998) the term ‘excellence’ is used rather than ‘goodness’.  
 12 
 
is derived entirely from the essence of what it is to be that entity. The function of a 
lecturer or learner is derived from the essence of what those entities exist for.11 
Although this has been a necessarily brief outline which cannot hope to do 
justice to Aristotle’s function argument,  hopefully, it will be sufficient for me to defend 
my claim that the role obligations of lecturers and learners are derived from the 
function of each of these roles.  
The function argument applied to the role of lecturer and learner 
Definitions of the lecturer and learner roles are necessarily broad at this stage 
and I acknowledge that further work is needed in this area. This is not intended to be 
an operational definition of specific activities performed by lecturers, but rather it is a 
definition aimed at describing the essence of this role in relation to the learner. For 
the purpose of this paper I should like to make the claim that the function of lecturers 
is to use their professional knowledge and skills, in order to take actions which could 
reasonably12 be expected to facilitate learning for all learners with whom they have a 
learning and teaching relationship. A person fulfilling this function may also have 
other functions, such as that of researcher. These additional functions will give rise 
to their own role obligations. The issue of conflicting role obligations is the focus of a 
future paper and will not be addressed here. My concern here is with the obligations 
of the lecturer, qua teacher.  
The normative role of the function argument means that individuals occupying 
the role of lecturer in higher education ought not to take any actions which are not 
aimed at fulfilling this function. If a lecturer fulfils all aspects of his or her role well, he 
                                                 
11 But in this case focussing on what they exist for in the learning and teaching context. 
12 That is, that any reasoning person would agree were likely to facilitate learning. By ‘reasoning person’ I am 
referring to people who reason before making a decision or arriving at an opinion. 
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or she could not be viewed as failing, or being deficient, in fulfilling the moral 
obligations of the role they occupy.  
Again, for the purpose of this paper, I am making the claim that the function of 
learners in higher education is to participate fully with all aspects of their learning, to 
the best of their abilities. In the same way as I argued above, the learner who wants 
to fulfil his or her function well must only take actions consistent with this function. If 
the learner takes actions not consistent with the function, he or she can be deemed 
to be failing or deficient in fulfilling their function. 
Role Obligations Strengthening the Normative Aspect of the 
Function Argument 
Aristotle is not claiming that “all intentional action aims at some good” 
(Lawrence 2006, p42), but only those actions taken deliberately towards achieving 
the ultimate good of fulfilling one’s function well. Aristotle is not claiming that all 
humans will always reason because everything they do in life will be aimed at the 
‘chief good’.  All he is saying is that humans will strive to fulfil their function of 
reasoning well if the purpose of their action is to work towards the wonderful life. 
However, this condition leaves scope for actions taken for other purposes.  Other 
such purposes might be, for example, the lecturer who cancels all his teaching 
because he wants to spend that time putting together a research bid, or the student 
who fails to prepare for classes because he wants to be the best partygoer. These 
role holders are not aiming at being excellent examples of lecturer and learner in 
order to achieve the greatest ‘good’ accorded to those functions. The concept of 
moral role obligations, discussed in an earlier section, strengthens this normative 
aspect of the function argument. The moral role obligations, derived from the 
functions of the lecturer and learner, oblige those who are voluntarily occupying 
these roles to only take actions consistent with the learner or lecturer function. If they 
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take actions which are not consistent with the role they voluntarily occupy, they can 
be considered as failing or being deficient in their moral obligations. 
Perhaps one of the most positive aspects of this current focus on what the 
lecturer is morally obliged to do for the learner, is that Universities will be under 
closer scrutiny of their actions to deal with failing or defective lecturers13. The student 
who fails to fulfil their moral role obligations, derived from their function as learner, 
sees the result of their deficiency in their assessment marks and degree 
classification. Many of us may remember lecturers who were not fulfilling their 
function well, for whom there were no consequences. As a result of the pendulum 
swinging the other way, this is no longer tolerated by learners. Of course, learners 
need to have a clear understanding of what the function of a lecturer is if they are to 
make reasonable claims of failure or deficiency. 
It is important to remember that the learner cannot demand that the lecturer 
take actions which are not consistent with the function and the role obligations 
derived from it. Students cannot demand a degree, regardless of their learning, 
merely because they now pay directly. Such a demand is not consistent with the 
function to facilitate learning and the lecturer is not obliged to acquiesce to such a 
demand. 
 
Conclusions and implications for Practice 
My claim that lecturers and learners have moral obligations to one another, 
derived from their functions, is not affected by the introduction of higher tuition fees. 
Those moral obligations would be there regardless of fees charged. But what has 
changed is that attention is focussed on what the lecturer is obliged to do for the 
                                                 
13 That is those not fulfilling their function well. 
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learner, particularly in the context of learning and teaching. This attention might be 
perceived as arising from students paying higher fees but I have shown there is a 
more fundamental source for the obligations of lecturers to learners, which may sit 
more comfortably with our view of education. Unfortunately, there is little current 
attention given to what the learner is obliged to do. This is the big gap in the current 
conversation and one that needs addressing if a reasonable balance is to be 
reached.  
The main implication for practice is to ensure that the attention is given to the 
moral obligations of both entities. The structure for higher education funding is, in the 
opinion of many, a misguided policy. The notion of learner as consumer is being 
pedalled by the government of the day but there is no reason why we, as 
practitioners, cannot frame our learning and teaching relationship in another way. 
We now need to engage students in reflecting on ways in which they can fulfil 
their role obligations as learners, as well as articulating more effectively our own role 
obligations and how we will fulfil them. Their role as a learner in higher education 
places upon them a moral obligation to fulfil their function well, as does our own. We 
need to use effective language to articulate the obligations of both parties. As 
lecturers, a change in the funding structure does not provide an extra moral role 
obligation, but we may need to be clearer about the reasoning behind this to our 
students. Possibly, in the past, the focus may have been more on the obligations for 
the students because the ‘tax payer’ was paying for their higher education and the 
students would reap the benefits in the future. Now they are paying directly and the 
benefits are much less certain, the pendulum is swinging the other way. It is now 
incumbent upon practitioners to take a lead in this debate, rather than leaving it to 
the politicians.  We need to restore the balance in reviewing, discussing and gaining 
 16 
 
consensus on the role obligations of both parties. Whilst I have made a tentative 
start in defining the function of these entities, this is only the beginning which, I hope, 
will prompt wide discussion. 
Many Universities use a ‘student contract’ to articulate these obligations but 
using legal and/or contractual language may perpetuate some of the problems 
anticipated with a consumer approach. However, the existence of a written 
document, outlining the moral obligations of both parties to the learning relationship, 
would make a helpful platform for conversations about this with our students; 
providing it is written in accessible language and is ‘owned’ by both students and 
staff. 
On a practical level, role obligations of both parties, can provide a useful 
platform for discussions on ground rules for group teaching and learning situations, 
as well as one to one learning and teaching relationships. Asking students to 
articulate to one another (as well as us) what they consider their function as a 
learner entails can lead nicely into discussions on the nature and skills of effective 
learning. Likewise, discussing what learners consider the function of a lecturer to be, 
in the learning and teaching relationship, can raise awareness of unreasonable or 
misguided expectations. Reminding learners throughout the module of what was 
discussed may facilitate on-going evaluation of how effectively both parties are 
fulfilling their role obligations. Making reference to the role obligations in end-of-
module evaluation surveys may prompt the learner to reflect on how effectively they 
have contributed to the learning and teaching process, rather than focusing 
exclusively on how well the lecturer has done; which is often the case.  
From the preceding discussion, I can conclude that learners and lecturers 
both have role obligations within the learning and teaching relationship. These role 
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obligations are derived from the functions of the roles that are voluntarily held by 
each party in that relationship. Using Aristotle’s function argument, I have shown that 
by ascertaining the respective functions of a learner and a lecturer, both descriptive 
and normative frameworks are revealed. The normative purpose is strengthened by 
articulation of the moral role obligations prior to, and during, the term of the learning 
and teaching relationship. I have suggested that viewing the obligations each party 
has to one another, within a framework of moral role obligations, would produce a 
more balanced, and less uncomfortable, position than that of a consumerist model. 
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